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FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
By C. A. PEAi-S,

JR.*

"Give me the liberty to know, to utter,
and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties."
"It's ugly; but is it Art?"
"Who steals my purse steals trash."

The subject of freedom of the press may be treated from any
one of four angles: it may be considered as a problem in moral
philosophy and political ethics; it may be dealt with as an interesting chapter in social and political history; it may be discussed
as a part of the broader subject, constitutional law; or it may
be argued as a vital issue in present-day statesmanship. It is
purposed here to treat it primarily from the aspect of the constitutional guarantees supporting it, with a brief historical sketch
of the growth of the doctrine, to indicate how it came to be
written thus firmly into all our constitutions, and with an even
briefer application of what is developed in the main body of the
paper as to present-day conditions. It will be seen that if the
open gates in the constitutional doctrine, and the straws blowing
in the wind of current comment, are true omens, the history of
the subject has not yet revealed its most interesting chapters.
The past history of the subject we view with a single eye; but we
are not sure as to where we should stand in the future, because
of the doubt as to the relative ethical positions of the potential
suppressed and their suppressors. This wavering position is
reflected only partially in past litigation, under different circum* A. B., M. A., LL. B., West Virginia University; LL. M., Harvard
University; associated with Joseph S. Farland and Albert M. Morgan,
Morgantown, W. Va.; now instructor in law, Northeastern University,
Boston, Mass. This article was awarded the James F. Brown Prize
for 1939 by West Virginia University in substantially its present form.
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stances and legal backgrounds, but the quarrels of today contain
the fights of yesterday.
The history of the struggle for freedom of the press may be
dated from the invention of the printing press in the midfifteenth century. At that time, the extent of its freedom was
less than zero; it was a negative quantity, because the press
started life fettered by the civil authorities and by the dignitaries
of the Church. The early presses, from the time of Guntenberg
on, were licensed, and their continuous operation depended on
the pleasure of the ruling classes. That, however, indicated no
peculiar status of this right, because all of the so-called civil
liberties, as we know them today, were similarly situated at that
time.'
William Caxton, having obtained special royal encouragement and the grant of privileges from Edward IV, established a
press in Westminster, in 1476.2 Since the existence rested on
royal favor, there was no question but that the privilege to disseminate knowledge through it could be allowed or withheld by
the ruler for reasons of state, or for no reason. Caxton and his
followers, however, raised no question of right, but refrained
from publishing anything that might be displeasing either to the
Crown or to the Church. From that time on, for almost three
centuries, licensing of the press continued in one form or another,
in England as well as on the Continent.
During the sixteenth century, sentiment seemed to tend toward greater restrictions on the press, and in France it was even
suggested that to save religion the art of printing ought to be
abolished. In England, Henry VIII issued particularly severe
regulations, 3 and after the inception of the new Established
Church absolute control was given to the King, to protect the
new Church.4 Under Queen Elizabeth, the emphasis seemed to
turn toward the licensing of individual publications, rather than
of printers. It is a pity, in some ways, that the rule was not
strictly enforced, and that manuscript copies of all early publica'For historical treatments of the subject see, Duntway, Freedom
of the Press in Massachusetts, Cambridge (1906); Paterson, Liberty
of the Press, Speech, and Public Worship, London (1880).
2Blades, William Caxton, ch. VI, cited in Paterson and Duniway.
See also Wittenberg, Literary Property (N. Y. 1937).
I Strype, Memorials (Oxford, 1812) 685, cited in Paterson.
434 and 35 Henry VIII,
c. 1.
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tions were not collected by some such agency. The library thus
gathered would today be priceless beyond all estimate.
The next step, in the seventeenth century, was the Star
Chamber, which took precautions to prevent the publication of
anything seditious as to the State or the Church.; There seems
to have been no doubt as to the legality of such restrictions, and
when the Star Chamber fell in 1641, Parliament took over this
function of government, and continued to exercise it through the
Commonwealth, and even after the Revolution of 1688. The Bill
of Rigbts of 1691 did not affect this practice. The Licensing Act
of 1662 endured until 1695, when it was abolished pursuant to an
act of 1693, when William and Mary's government decided to
quit it, because of public indignation at the practices of the
incumbent licenser.0 Thus, in 1695, died the last previous
restraint on freedom of the press, and the law of the eighteenth
century of Blackstone was that liberty of the press was guaranteed, as to previous restraints, although no objection seems to
have been made to subsequent prosecution. This state of the
law continued until 1792, when Fox's Libel Act was passed,
giving the right to have a jury to determine the meaning and
7
intention of the alleged libel.
We see, then, that freedom of the press grows by various
stages. It starts from absolute prohibition, as seen in the ecclesiastical law of the fifteenth century, and the proposed French
law under Francis I. The next step is licensed printing, with
official indices 1ibrorum prohibitorum,as compiled by Pope Paul
IV in 1557. Other previous restraints have been taxes, as practiced in England from Anne to Victoria. The next step is freedom from previous restraints. The final step, won in England
after Thomas Erskine's Case,8 and consisting of the right to speak
free from subsequent prosecution, with greater or less qualification, is that existing even in America today.
When the colonies were settled, licensing was a recognized
restraint, and previous restraints, and severe prosecutions, took
8

Prothero, Statutes, 168. See Wittenberg, op. cit. supra, n. 2. The

Star Chamber was abolished a few years later by Parliament (17

Charles I, cc. 10, 11).
6 The Licensing Act of 1662 was enacted in 13 and 14 Charles II,

c. 33. It was abolished under 4 W and M, c. 24.
732 George III, c. 60. Blackstone's statement of the law, outlawing "previous restraints", is in vol. 4 Commentaries, p. 151.

'See an account of Erskine's trial in 20 State Trials, p. 839 if.
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place during the seventeenth, century, in the cases of Anne Hutchinson, Roger Williams, and their like. One of the early presses
in this country was the Glover press, imported by him in 1638.
The control passed soon afterwards from Glover to Henry Dunster, President of Harvard University. The Dunster press
experienced difficulties with the authorities, and after Henry
Dunster was forced to resign for his heretical printings, President
Chauncey took over the supervision of the press until a censorship
board was established in 1662. 9 The censorship board died with
the Andros government in 1689, and the censorship went into
the hands of the legislatures, which treated unlicensed printing
summarily. Censorship continued in the colonies somewhat later
than in England, but it vanished during the first half of the eighteenth century, dying about the time of the unsuccessful prosecution of James Franklin. In Virginia some trouble was had after
Governor Berkeley left, but the press was kept down even more
completely than he had, until 1765, there being no printing in
Virginia from 1684 to 1729, at all.10
The immediate cause of the strong feeling in the colonies for
freedom of the press was possibly the prosecution in 1735 of Zenger, in New York, for libel. He was defended by Andrew Hamilton, a famous lawyer of the day, who persuaded the jury to
acquit him contrary to the law of that day.11 Thereafter,
freedom of the press was jealously defended in the colonies, and
this feeling contributed to the popular indignation at the Stamp
Act. The press seems to have remained free in this country
from 1735 until the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, and the
failure of those acts, and the acquittal of Crosswell in 1804,12
seem to have been the final guarantee of the right. The doctrine
does not appear in the original constitution; it seems that no one
thought it really necessary. It was added, however, in the First
Amendment, and the Federal Constitutional provision thus
added, and the provisions of the Hamiltonian state constitutions
became the nucleus of the law as it exists today. It is well, therefore, to examine in detail the constitutional guaranties of freedom
of the press, in order to determine as nearly as may be their
*Duniway, op. cit. supra, n.1, pp. 41-62.
I See Callahan, Semi-Centenial History of W. Va. for a discussion
of this point.
Chafee, Freedom of Speech, N. Y., 1920, ch. 1.
3 Johns Cas. 337.
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extent today, and the exceptions and limitations which must be
recognized under them.
There are three constitutional guaranties that must be dealt
with in any consideration of the restrictions which might be
placed on freedom of the press. The first is the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which provides: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. . ." This is a limitation on the acts of Congress, and is
substantially the only one. 13 The Fourteenth Amendment is a
Federal restriction on state laws, in its requirement of due process in state acts, although it does not specifically mention any of
the guaranties of the first ten amendments. 14
The third guaranty, the state constitution, varies, of course,
from state to state. But as a matter of fact almost all states
have the same provision. That of Illinois is typical: "Every
person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being

responsible for the abuse of that liberty.''15 There are a few
exceptions, such as Vermont, which pattern their provisions after
that of the Federal Constitution. The only substantial variation
in wording occurs in the West Virginia provision:
"No law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, shall
be passed; but the Legislature may, by suitable penalties, restrain the

publication of obscene books, papers, 6 or pictures, and provide for the
punishment of libel or defamation."'

It is apparent, of course, that the difference in wording in
the West Virginia provision is one which has been read into those
of other states, and that the law of this provision is the same as
under other state constitutions, or even, as will be seen, under
the Federal Constitution.
11U. S. Constitution, Amendment I. For cases discussing its general
effect, see Horner v. U. S., 143 U. S. 207, 36 L. ed. 126, 12 Sup. Ct. 407
(1892), 143 U. S. 570, 36 L. ed. 266, 12 Sup. Ct. 522 (1892); Robertson
v. Baldwin) 165 U. S. 275, 41 L. ed. 715, 17 Sup. Ct. 326 (1897); Lewis

Pub. Co. v. Moyan, 229 U. S. 288, 57 L. ed. 1190, 33 Sup. Ct. 867 (1913);

Assoc. Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 103, 81 L. ed. 953, 57 Sup. Ct. 650
(1937).
1I See for cases dealing with the general application of the Amendment to state infringements on freedom of the press, Fox v. WashIngton, 236 U. S. 273, 59 L. ed. 573, 35 Sup. Ct. 383 (1915); Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 65 L. ed. 287, 41 Sup. Ct. 125 (1920); N. Y.
ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 Sup. Ct. 61
(1928). See also Palko v. Conn., a case involving the inclusion of the

Sixth Amendment in the Fourteenth, and Stromberg v. Calif., 283 U. S.
359, 75 L. ed. 1117, 51 Sup. Ct. 532 (1931).
13Const. Illinois, Art. II, sec. 4.
-6W. Va. Const. (1872) Art. III, sec. 7.
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Much has been written in an effort to explain what ought to
be self-evident: That the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
the press is qualified, and does not forbid reasonable restrictions
of a police nature in criminal law, or preclude civil liability for
outrageous publication, if it amounts to a libel. These qualifications are articulated in the West Virginia Constitution, but
are none the less true in other cases, as is evident from the cases
interpreting them. It is probably not necessary to go further
here to establish the fact of such qualifications, which has been
dealt with, more than adequately, elsewhere.1 7 It may be proper,
then, to proceed to an examination of the extent of such qualifications, under the Constitutional cases.
Sedition, obscenity, blasphemy, and defamation: These are
the cornerstones of the legal structure which we are about to
examine. Contempt of court is a quintum quid which, in a careful analysis of the cases, neither fits in any of the categories
above, nor stands beside them as a separate basis of limitation of
the constitutional liberty. Contempt cases must be discussed
together with the others, bearing in mind a slightly different
approach which will be noted in such cases. Cases involving
sedition will be found to be chiefly federal cases, and may be
found under special circumstances which induce decisions formulating new doctrines, which in turn are later extended to
apply to cases not arising under such special circumstances.
It may be well in dealing with the cases involving sedition to
build the discussion around one or two important "leading cases"
on the subject. -There have been in the history of this country
two important legislative enactments on this subject. The first
was the unpopular Sedition Act of 1798, and the second, the
popular Espionage Act of 1917. The cases arising under the
latter act are interesting because they indicate the extent to
which this constitutional guaranty will be upheld where there is
no element whatever of personal sympathy for the defendant
"Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press Under the First Amend-

ment, 30 Yale L. J. 410 (1919); Chafee, Freedom of Speech, supra,
n. 11; Wettach, Restrictions on a Free Press, 4 N. C. L. Rev. 24 (1925);
Michael, Freedom of the Press Under our Courts, 33 W. Va. L. Q. 29
(1926); Pinsky, Freedom of Speech Under Our Constitutions, 31
W. Va. L. Q. 273 (1924). Many similar generalizations, distinguishing
between "liberty and license", are found in the cases. See for an early
discussion the opinion in Rex v. Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 95 (1820). See
for a non-technical discussion Eliel, Freedom of Speech, 18 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 712 (1924).
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involved in the particular case. In the Espionage Act cases the
publications in question were almost universally condemned so
far as the purely moral aspect of their publication was concerned;
their only defenders were eorundem generis, the ultra-liberal
press. However, opinion as to the constitutionality of a statute
making such publications criminal was almost evenly divided,
indicating a special position over and above desirability guaranteed by the provision in question.
The law of sedition is probably more important than that
relating to obscene, blasphemous, or libelous publications. In
times of peace little is heard about restrictions on sedition and
political libels; the general practice is to let the malcontents rave,
and not to prosecute. But "war does make a difference.' '18
Today, in 1939, the problem becomes more acute than it was two
or three years ago. The majority public opinion of the nation
is becoming fairly well aligned on one side of a great world issue.
There is a small minority in disagreement with it. Popular feeling runs ever higher, and even the most dignified and conservative publications begin, at least by implication, to encourage
throughts of suppression of such "ism" publications, and the
legislature appropriates money to investigate the small groups
out of step with the majority- Out of such an investigation may
come legislation. And with its constitutionality we must deal,
as nearly as may be, by an analysis of similar previous restraints
and their fates.
As will be seen, the political issue runs in cycles, and is
comparatively infrequently before the courts; but it is none the
less the most important single issue in the field. Democracy is
not threatened by censorship of obscene matter; it may be
vaguely, by the misuse of such a censorship, or by an overgrown
and greatly misused curb on blasphemy or libel, which will in
realty amount to something else; but so long as the terms are
kept within their bounds, it will be seen that none of them except
sedition presents a direct challenge to free political communication.
There seemed to be little doubt that during the first few
years of the existence of the United States government, when
2Schenck
v. U. S., infra, n. 43. See also O'Donnell, Military Censorship and the Freedom of the Press, 5 Va. L. Rev. 178 (1918), and
Note (1922) 9 Va. L. Rev. 516 on the military restrictions imposed
during the Civil War.
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European countries still regarded them as colonial territory,
title to which was temporarily unsettled, there was a great deal
of interference of foreign powers in our domestic affairs. French
propaganda and other attempts to transfer American loyalties
led to severe punishments for libel, in common-law prosecutions
in the last years of the eighteenth century. 1 9 The demands for
legislation on the subject grew out of doubts as to the exact status
of libel under the common law, and the severe penalties meted
out under it. The Sedition Act was passed, therefore, as a clarifying measure rather than as a means of creating new offenses.
It provided for the punishment of combinations and conspiracies
to oppose measures of the United States Government, "or to
impede the operation of any law" thereof, or to intimidate
government officials, and incitation to riot or insurrection.
This part of the law was so clearly reasonable that it met with no
specific protest; objections to the law were directed at the other
provisions of the Act. Section II provided for the punishment
of false, scandalous, and malicious defamations of the Government, the Congress, or the President, and of publications calculated to bring them into contempt or disrepute, and of publications calculated to aid or indicate sedition or treason. 20 The
Democratic opponents of the Act attacked it on three grounds,
denying the constitutionality of such a measure.
The first objection to the Act was a negative one. It had
been urged that the Act was necessarily constitutional as declaratory of the common law. It was answered that the common law
was not in force as a part of the law of the United States, and a
common-law Act was not necessarily constitutional. Congress
seems to have considered the common law to be in operation; contemporary debates contained the argument that the common
law was still in force because not abrogated by the Constitution.
James Madison, as leader of the objectors, claimed that the common law was not a part of the law of the United States prior to
the adoption of the Constitution, and therefore historically not
part of the law of the United States unless made so by the Constitution.21 The Constitution contains no direct answer,
although it speaks of "law and equity" cases as part of the judiSee U. S. v. Worrall, 2 Dallas 384, 1 L. ed. 426 (U. S. 1798).
1
2 U. S. Statutes 596.
Madison's Writings (Ed. by Hunt), vol. VI, 373.
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cial power. Opponents of the Act said that "law and equity"
meant civil cases only, and such seems to have been the attitude
later taken by the Supreme Court. 22 However, even if this
objectioa was tenable, it merely brought the argument up to
zero; it proved that the Act was not necessarily constitutional,
but it did not prove it unconstitutional.
The second point raised by Madison and others who took the
same position was that no mention of control over the press was
made in the enumeration of powers delegated to Congress in
Article I of th.e Constitution; the Democrats contended that there
was never any intent that Congress should control the press. 2 3
This position seems to have been well taken, and was conceded
fairly generally to be accurate. The proponents of the measure,
however, supported it on the grounds that the right to selfpreservation is inherent in every government, and that such a
measure was within the scope of the "necessary and proper"
clause of the Constitution. These arguments seem to rest on a
part of the Constitution not anywhere expressed, but which "so
entirely pervades it, is so intermixed with the materials which
compose it. . . as to be incapable of being separated from it.24
It has been recognized in many cases that any government must
perforce be permitted certain functions essential to its own organization and existence, even though they arise neither from any
specifically granted power, nor from the necessity of continuing
government -25 This general principle is clearly recognized by
all who support the varied governmental activities of today, and
the 1939 answer to the second objection raised would undoubtedly
be in favor of the Act.
Not so clear, however, is the answer to the third point-that
a different status was given to the press by the First Amendment.
No matter how broad a discretion is allowed Congress, in the
scope of its activities, it has no power to enact legislation specifically prohibited by some clause in-the Constitution. Here again,
7 U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 3 L. ed. 259 (U. S. 1812).
2 See T. F. Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the
Federalist Period, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 615 (1920) for a discussion of the
arguments referred to here.
2Marshall, ch. J., in McCulloch v. Md., 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579
(U. S.1819), discussing the principle of the immunity of Federal instrumentalities from state taxation.
Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S.698, 37 L. ed. 905, 13 Sup. Ct.
1016 (1892) (The power to exclude aliens.).
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Madison, arguing historically, attempted to demonstrate that the
First Amendment was intended to cover just this sort of thing.2 6
The interpretation of the terms "abridge" and "freedom of the
press", however, proved more difficult to determine. Madison
attempted to demonstrate that the phrase "shall not abridge"
was equivalent to "shall make no law respecting", because of the
difference in the terminology of the Amendment respecting
speech, press, and religion, which should, he said, clearly be
accorded the same degree of freedom under it.27 However, his
argument seems to fall, because the first section of the Act was
admittedly proper, and its existence seems to have been inconsistent with this argument.
Granting, then, that some control may be exercised over the
press by Congress, the definition of "freedom of the press"
becomes important, as limiting the control which may be exercised. The logical definition to be applied at the time of the Sedition Act was that of Blackstone, which was good law in England,
and had been accepted by many colonial judges; indeed, few lawyers, probably, thought of "liberty of the press" in any other
sense, except those who had heard political arguments now
advanced for a freer interpretation. The two characteristics
laid down by Blackstone of freedom of the press were freedom
from previous restraints (licensing provisions), and freedom
from punishment, on fair trial, for "non-pernicious" publications. Such a right was clearly not infringed by an act such as
the one in question, providing for a fair jury trial.
The Democrats contended, on the other hand, that the Blackstonian theory was not law in the United States, and that the
nature of the United States government required a greater freedom of the press than was allowed in England. 28 The first argument was based on the practice of the press in the States; non
constat, however, that there was any claim of right in such publications. The second argument has later received support in
the growth of the thought that the press must, in a democratic
nation, be freed from subsequent as well as from previous
6 Madison's Writings, 390-2.
6 Madison's Writings, 400-1.
See Schofield, Freedom of the Press, infra, n. 137; Schroeder,
op. cit. infra, ch. VIII. American judges seem to have adopted the
Blackstone theory, however. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick.
(Mass.) 304 (1825). See also Vance, Freedom of Speech and of the
Press, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 239 (1918).
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restraints, and in the increasing limitations on the restraints
which may be exercised. However, in Madison's time he was
about the only one who took such a position, and the Sedition Act
would probably have been held constitutional, if the question had
been taken to the Supreme Court at that time.
Further. discussion of the constitutionality of the Sedition
Act should perhaps be postponed to a general discussion of the
scope of the First Amendment. It may be well, however, to note
briefly the enforcement of the Act. It appears that in the earlier
prosecutions considerable moderation, was exercised, but as offenses continued, and as political feeling ran high during the
election of 1800, those enforcing the law clamped down until its
effect was little, if any, less severe than that of the Blackstonian
common law. However, there were relatively few prosecutions
under it during the three years it remained in effect, and after it
expired it was never re-enacted. Out of a total of about thirty arrests and sixteen indictments, there were only ten or eleven trials,
all resulting in convictions. Punishment grew more severe
toward the end of the period; even in the case of an individual
judge, such as Chase, a great deal of difference was noted between
his treatment of Cooper and that of Callender, two years later,
where the issue was complicated by the participation of th.e
29
Democratic Richmond bar.
The judges trying cases under the Act declined to hold it
unconstitutional, inviting the defendants to take the question of
constitutionality to the Supreme Court. The defendants, realizing that their constitutional objections were weak, under a court
consisting of Federalist appointees, at least, and that their political position was strong, declined to appeal, and the question was
saved for a later act. The significance of the Sedition Act and
the controversy which raged over it is rather slight as a legal
matter, and its story is chiefly notable as a matter of political
history. Almost every move of either side in connection with it
may be traced to contemporary politics, while few of them
influenced the development of any constitutional doctrine.
2 See for accounts of the trials of Callender, Cooper, Haswell, and
Lyon, under the Sedition Act, Wharton, State Trials, pp. 333, 659, 684,
688. The historical background is indicated in these sketches. See also
Lyon's Case, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8646 (C. C. Vt. 1798); U. S. v. Butterfield,
25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,704 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1875); U. S. v. Cooper, 125
Fed. Cas. No. 14,865 (C. C. Pa. 1800); U. S. v. Mundell, 27 Fed. Cas.
No. 15,834 (C. C. Va. 1795).

L. J.-2
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It would seem, on examination of the 1798 Act, together
with the First Amendment, that it was in violation at least of
the spirit of the Constitutional provision. Liberty of the press
as declared in the First Amendment and the English common-law
crime of sedition cannot co-exist, logically, whether the prescribed
test of sedition is in form the tendency of the publication or the
intent of the author or publisher. Tendency and intent have
been prescribed as separate tests, but in practical application
they come around to the same thing, the tendency, under the rule
of United States v. PressPublishing Co.30 being used as evidence
of the intent. It was settled in United States v. Hudson,3 ' that
sedition is not a part of the common criminal law of the United
States, and the Act of 1798 rested on no better footing, although
the sympathetic court might well have upheld it, because as has
been shown above, the constitutional objections are not easily
articulated as a matter of logic, but are more a matter of interpretation of the spirit of the rule. That spirit was recognized
and not violated for more than a century. Whether the statutes
of the World War period or their application violated it must
be decided from an examination of the decisions under them, and
of their historical and legislative background.
The World War and the Imperial German Government's
openly avowed willingness to encourage disloyalty among its
enemy's citizens brought the subject into bold relief. It was felt
that the considerations in favor of legislation on the subject of
espionage and foreign propoganda were sufficiently weighty to
overcome the fundamental policy of the country, born in the
Declaration of Independence, and arising from English law which
led to the Revolution, against such laws. The first legislation,
passed in February, 1917, was clearly within the power of Congress, since it affected only the mails.3 2 That act, however, did
not meet the more difficult problem of meeting German attempts
to arouse disloyalty, so in June, 1917, the Espionage Act was
passed, establishing three new offenses: (1) False statements or
reports interfering with military or naval operations or promoting the success of our enemies; (2) causing or attempting to
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in
2219 U. S. 1, 55 L. ed. 65, 31 Sup. Ct. 212 (1910).
"7 Cranch 32, 3 L. ed. 259 (U. S. 1812), cited, supra, n. 22.

1239 Stat. 230 U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918), Sec. 10381. Construed In
Magon v. U. S., 248 Fed. 201 (N. D. N. Y. 1918).
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the military and naval forces; (3) obstructions of enlistment and
33
recruiting.
The Espionage Act was given a fairly strict interpretation
by the courts, and the Attorney General, at least, felt that it was
missing complete effectiveness in failing to reach "impulsive or
casual," disloyal utterances. To cover the gaps in the Espionage
Act, the so-called Sedition Act of May, 1918, was passed, enlarging the roster of offenses to include (1) attempting by word or
act to obstruct the sale of United States bonds, (2) uttering or
publishing disloyal language, or language intended to bring the
United States form of government, or the flag, or the Constitution, or the military uniform, into disrepute, or language
intended to incite resistance to the United States or to promote
the cause of the enemies, and (3) advocating curtailment of production of war materials, or advocating or teaching or defending
34
the disloyal acts mentioned.
Legislation similar to that outlined here was passed in
several of the states. The sum total of the new laws affected a
large portion of the fly-by-night publications at least occasionally,
and indirectly affecting a large proportion of the people of the
country, readers of such publications. The result was (a) a
tremendous howl of protest, which precipitated a discussion as to
the constitutionality and the desirability of such legislation which
lasted for almost ten years with considerable furor, and (b) a
considerable volume of litigation over prosecutions under the
statutes mentioned. The law of these cases forms a small but not
unimportant item in our constitutional law today. It may be
well in dealing with this phase of sedition law to present the
cases first, in order to be able to discuss the various arguments
which have been made in the light of an analysis of the law as
under the cases it seems to be.
One of the most important of the early prosecutions was
involved in Masses Pztb. Co. v. Patten.35 In that case, Postmaster Patten, of New York, excluded an issue of The Masses
from the mails, on the vague general ground that the whole tone
of the publication was in violation of the Espionage Act, without
"40 Stat. 217 U. S. Comp. Stat., 1918, Sec. 10212 (c). See U. S. v.
Pierce, 245 Fed. 878 (1917),
1441 Stat. 425-6. See 4
of the Attorney General as
246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A.

construing this Act.
A. B. A. J. 306 (1918) for the complaints
to the ineffectiveness of the 1917 Act.
2d Cir. 1917).
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relying on any specific ground of objection to the periodical, or
on any specific statutory provision. An injunction was obtained
from Judge Learned Hand in the District Court. The injunction was stayed, however, and the Circuit Court of Appeals (2d)
affirmed the stay. It is interesting to note that although the
Postmaster-General's staff, the Attorney-General's staff, and
many members of Congress were either working on the case or
actively discussing the controversy while it went on, the whole
court battle was fought in New York City.
Judge Hand, though he admitted in his opinion 3G that some
of the material specifically objected to, in the number of The
Masses before the court, was "designed to arouse animosity to
the war", felt that because the written matter did not "counsel
resistance to law" it did not violate the Espionage Act. Another
ground for his refusal to enjoin was the absence of a specific
provision of the Act making the material non-mailable rather
than criminal, as a method of enforcement. Judge A. N. Hand
sustained the exclusion of the September issue of the magazine,
saying that it was not a magazine or other publication regularly
issued under the postal laws, because of the proper exclusion of
certain issues from the mails. This decision joins sharp issue
with the opinion in the earlier case, since it justifies both
exclusions.
The Masses case involved three constitutional questions, in
addition to one of statutory interpretation of the Espionage Act.
The constitutional issues were the applicability of the First
Amendment to circulation in the mails, the reviewability of
decisions of the Postmaster-General's department by the courts,
and whether the due process clause is violated by such exclusion.
The question of statutory interpretation for the court to
decide was whether, under the Espionage Act, guilt was to be
limited to those cases where there was a direct appeal to persons
to violate the law, or was to include as well the use of language
reasonably tending to promote illegality. The courts have not
agreed on this point, whether the remote or the immediate tendency of the publication to produce the evils aimed at was to be
the test. The cases of Schenck v. U. S., Debs v. U. S., Abranms. v.
U. S., Frohwerk v. U. S., Gitlow v. U. S. and Pierce v. U. S.,30A
1244 Fed. 535 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
3A Secs. 43, 44, 45, 46, 52, infra,

and 33, supra.
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to be discussed below, all contribute to the confusion on the point.
In the Masses case, a difference of opinion was shown when Judge
Learned Hand said:
"If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or
to their interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be
held to have attempted to cause its violation. If that be not the test,
I can see no escape from the conclusion that under this section every
political agitation which can be shown to be apt to produce a seditious
temper is illegal. I am confident that . . Congress had no such
revolutionary purpose in view . . . to assimilate agitation, legitimate

as such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard
the tolerance which in normal times is a safeguard of free government."'3B

Judge Rogers, of the Circuit Court of Appeals stated in the
same case:
"If the natural and reasonable effect of what is said is to encourage
resistance to the law and the words are used in the endeavor to persuade to resistance, it is immaterial that the duty to resist is not mentioned.

."O

The first constitutional point raised under the Masses case,
that the denial of postal facilities is tantamount to a denial of the
right of publication, has had many supporters. The eases, however, do not bear out the contention. The postal department has
been permitted to exclude lottery tickets, and publications containing lottery tickets, from the mails, not alone on the ground
that the discrimination on the ground of the nature of advertising matter contained was not a denial of freedom of publication,
since under the regulation publications of any sort could be
carried so long as the advertisements were unobjectionable, but,
also, on the ground of the discretion of the Government to refuse
to be a party to the circulation of matter which it regards as
injurious to the people.3 7 Under the latter ground it would be
quite proper for the Government to ban from the mails any
material tending to contravene the governmental public policy
within commonly understood due process limitations on the
theoretically non-existent, but actually much-exercised, Federal police power. Some cases have gone even further, and
would grant the government absolute discretion in the control
"B244 Fed. 535, 540 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
16 246 Fed. 24, 38 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1917).
21See T. F. Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in War
Time, 17 Mich. L. Rev. 621 (1919), for a detailed treatment of these

arguments.
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of its own agencies and the extent of their use3S-a valid argument it seems, if and only if the government permits private
postal agencies to function in competition with itself. But if the
government has a monopoly, enforced, on mail carriage, then an
internal regulation of its postal system has the effect of a general
law.
The second point, administrative finality of dicisions of the
Postmaster-General as to what may be mailed, was clearly settled
by early cases in favor of finality. 39 Thus in Bates & Guild Co.
v. Payne,40 the rule was stated:
*.
where Congress has committed to the head of a department certain duties requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his
action thereon, whether it involves questions of law or fact, will not
be reviewed by the courts, unless he has exceeded his authority or this
court should be of the opinion that his action was clearly wrong."

The "unless" clause, of course, contains room for a reversal of
actual practice, and a full judicial review might well be granted
under the last clause. It is doubtful whether the post-war Court
would have adhered so strictly to the rule of finality, but the
tendency today seems to be for the pendulum to swing back in
that direction from an extension of the doctrine of Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borozgh and Crowell v. Bensog.41 The
recent cases affecting the Department of Agriculture4 2 should
not, it is submitted, affect the issue in the Post Office Department,
because of the different nature of the administrative work
affected.
The third question, that of due process, seems also to have
been easily answered, to judge from Judge Rogers' opinion in the
Circuit Court of Appeals. As a matter of fact, the argument
was as of that time rather weak, resting on the contention that
due process meant judicial process. Under long standing prac3'Pub. Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. ed. 1092, 24
Sup. Ct. 789 (1904). See also the Jackson and Rapier cases, infra.
See U. S. ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 32 L. ed. 354, 9
Sup. Ct. 12 (1888).
10
194 U. S. 106, 108, 48 L. ed. 894, 29 Sup. Ct. 595 (1909).
4'
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 64
L. ed. 908, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (19P0); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22,
76 L. ed. 598, 52 Sup. Ct. 285 (1932), (on due process requirements of
judicial
review of administrative findings in general).
4
2Morgan v. U. S., 8 F. Supp. 766 (1934), 298 U. S. 468 (1936),
23 F. Supp. 380 (1937), 304 U. S. 1, 82 L. ed. 1129, 82 Sup. Ct. 773
(1938), 24 F. Supp. 214 (1937), 304 U. S.590, 53 Sup. Ct. 999 (1938),
(reviewing of decisions of the Secretary of Agriculture under the
Packers and Stockyards Act).
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tice, and the law of almost all the states, that is not the case,
although the tendency of the Supreme Court during the Twenties
seemed to be to examine all cases possible, under the due process
clause, at least as to state proceedings, and to require an examination of cases by state judicial tribunals.
In the Schenck case, 43 the defendant was indicted for distributing circulars to prospective objects of the military draft,
urging them to resist the draft. The conviction was upheld by a
unanimous Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote the opinion, saying:
"Of course the document would not have been sent unless it had
been intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it
could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft except to
influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out."

In the opinion, however, Mr. Justice Holmes laid down the following test on the constitutional point, much-quoted later by
students of the subject as well as by dissenting justices in subsequent appeals. He said:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are of such

a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."

The conclusion reached was, of course, that the words used in this
case did create such a "clear and present danger."
The interesting problem arises upon application of the test in subsequent
eases.
In Froiwerk v. U11 ited States, 44 Mr. Justice Holmes again
delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The facts did not
differ greatly from those of the Schenck case, the chief difference
being that here the publications were in a newspaper, the Hissouri Staats Zeitung. There seemed to be little difficulty in holding the Sceenck rule applicable, and the First Amendment not;
Justice Holmes says:
"It is impossible to say that it might not have been found that the
circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would
be enough to kindle a flame, and that the fact was known and relied
upon by those who sent the paper out."

In Debs v. United States,4 5 decided th.e same day as the Frohwck case, the question was really one of freedom of speech rather
'249 U. S. 47, 63 L. ed. 470, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919).
" 249 U. S. 204, 63 L. ed. 561. 40 Sup. Ct. IS (1919).
1-249 U. S. 211, 63 L. ed. 566, 39 Sup. Ct. 252 (1919).
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than of the press; however, the same statute and the same constitutional tests were involved, so it may be safely treated with
the other cases in the group. The speech made by Debs in the
case had undoubtedly a tendency to bring about resistance to the
draft, and the jury convicted him under the trial courts "natural
tendency and reasonably probable effect" test. The conviction
was affirmed, Mr. Justice Holmes again writing the opinion, which
was ,couched in the phrases of an ordinary test of indirect causation and constructive intent, instead of forcing on the trial court
and jury the "clear and immediate" test elsewhere indicated as
required by the Constitutional First Amendment.
The Abrams case 4 6 involved slightly different facts from any
of the others, and is notable chiefly for the dissent of Mr. Justice
Holmes, who wrote the opinions in the other three cases. The
dissenting opinion in this case makes the doctrinal issue on this
point of constitutional law, which might never have been noted
had not this, the least important in many of its political aspects
of the sedition cases, arisen. The publications in the case were
pamphlets, one in English and one in Yiddish, containing Communistic propaganda, together with specific exhortations for a
general strike. These pamphlets appear from the evidence to
have been issued not to hinder the progress of the war with Germany, but rather to stop intervention in Russia, and to aid the
cause of the revolution in that country. In the trial, conducted
by Judge Clayton, 47 many things took place which have been
cited by critics of the Act and of those administering it, and of
the government, to show bias or prejudice. Clear it is, that the
things advocated by the defendant, if not anathema to their
times, at least had a considerable tendency to arouse hostility.
The "indirect causation" tests were applied in a militant fashion
which may have had something to do with the opinion of Justices
Homes and Brandeis that the conviction should be reversed.
In the Supreme Court the main issue, in addition to the
minor one of specific intent, was whether the Espionage Act could
constitutionally be interpreted to apply to this case. The Schenck
case is not overruled by Mr. Justice Clarke, writing for the
majority, so for the purpose of doctrine the "clear and present
'250 U. S. 616, 63 L. ed. 1173, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919).
47See Chafee A Contemporary State Trial, 33 Harvard L. Rev. 747

(1920).
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danger" test may be considered to be law still. There is no question, as between the majority or the minority, of the constitutionality of the statute in question, properly construed. The difference arises in the application of that statute to this case, under
the authority of cases decided under the 1917 act, before the 1918
amendments, which were used also to support the construction
here given the Act. Holmes, dissenting, seems to wish a far more
rigid constitutional safeguard, fettering the Act to confine its
scope to cases of immediate threats to interests which Congress
may protect:
"....

only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave

the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception
to the sweeping command 'Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech.'

"8

The nicety of the argument on the specific intent point
reduced it almost to a constitutional issue, whether Congress
could punish acts which were directly intended to paralyze industry in this country, and which would necessarily affect the progress of the war, or whether it was restricted to punishment of
acts intended specifically to impede our participation in the war.
The real issue was whether the Act passed did make the deeds
involved here criminal; but the language used in the opinion, and
by commentators, is constitutional language, and the authorities
cited are constitutional authorities, bearing on the other point.
The Abrams case has been widely criticized, and the controversy between "present danger" and "remote tendency" as the
test of a publication's effect for the purpose of determining its
punishability under the Constitution has grown into what may be
called for want of a better term a living constitutional issue. In
spite of the decision in the Abrams case, where the issue was
joined, the law today is probably the clear and present danger
test; the question is one of "proximity and degree," 49 but not
of proximate cause. State prosecutions, brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, have defined this test more clearly. Mr.
Justice Brandeis, in Whitney v. California, ° presents it as
follows:
"In order to support finding of clear and present danger it must
be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected
- 250 U. S. 616, 631, 40 Sup. Ct. 17, 22 (1919).

"Holmes, J.in Schenck v. U. S., supra, n. 43.
274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927).
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or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe
that such advocacy was then contemplated."5A

The test had been announced by Brandeis in Schaefer v. United
States,51 in 1920, in a dissent, and the majority accepted the test,
under the Schenck case, without committing itself to the strict
interpretation placed on the test by the Abrans and Schaefer
dissents. In Gitlow v. New York, the state anarchy statute punished "not mere historical or philosophical essays,
but
advocating, advising or teaching the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means.' '52 The court held the statute constitutional under the "direct effect" test, and refused to consider
its constitutionality as applied to a specific case:
"It is sufficient that the statute itself be constitutional and that
the use of the language comes within its prohibition. The question
whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class Is
likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open
to consideration."

Justices Holmes and Brandeis thought otherwise:
"If ...
the correct test is applied it is manifest that there was no
present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by force
on the part of the admittedly small minority who shared the defendant's views ...
Eloquence may set fire to reason. But ... the
redundant discourse before us had no chance of starting a present
conflagration."

It seems that there is an inconsistency to be found between
the very strict application of the present danger test urged by
Holmes and Brandeis in these later cases, and the opinions in the
Schenck and Frohwerk cases. It is submitted that in none of
these cases could it be said "that a very small spark would not
set off a conflagration, under the circumstances under which the
publication was circulated, and that those circumstances were
not taken into account by the defendant," to paraphrase the
language of those cases. The doctrinal difference between the
present danger test and that of remote tendency is of no practical
importance in a case, because either may be applied to reach the
result intended by the proponents of the other. That this is so
seems amply demonstrated by the refusal of the court to
OA274 U. S. 357, 576 (1927).

M251 U. S. 466, 64 L. ed. 360, 40 Sup. Ct. 259 (1920).
- 268 U. S. 652, 69 L. ed. 1138, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925); Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 59 L. ed. 573, 35 Sup. Ct. 383 (1915).
See also
State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N. W. 181 (1918), and State v. Fox,
71 Wash. 185, 127 Pac. 1111 (1912).
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reexamine the facts in the Schenck case, and the desire of Air.
Justice Holmes to do so in such a case as the Gitlow case. In spite
of this conceptual inconsistency, however, it is quite clear that
there are two possible results in any appellate case except the
clearest one, and it is believed that the strict application of the
constitutional provisions, advocated by Holmes and Brandeis,
will be, actually, the law in future cases. The present court is
composed largely of men who feel that "freedom of the press
means freedom of those whose ideas we dislike," and as to sedition cases, at least, we may expect to see the First and Fourteenth
Amendments given a great deal of weight.
Before leaving the subject of sedition,5 3 however, it may be
well to consider some of the collateral phases of the last great
national attempt to curb it, as well as some of the earlier authority dealing with the subject.
One of the livest legal discussions inspired by the group of
cases just discussed arose from the Masses case; it was widely
contended that exclusion from the mails was a previous restraint
on freedom of the press, and hence bad under even the Blackstonian theory. The decisions settling the contrary rule, such as
Ex parte Jackson, and In re Rapier, 4 were criticised, as allowing
a practical destruction of a periodical's circulation, and actually
exercising a greater restraint on liberty of the press than a subsequent penalty. It was contended by the Attorney-General that
undei- the same theory Congress could exclude undesirable matter
from interstate commerce, but the Court negatived that argument
by dictum in the Jackson,and Rapier cases, evidently feeling that
closing those chamels would be more directly a governmental
interference than the mere refusal to carry as mail.5 5
A far more important issue than that of the constitutionality of the enactments of the wartime period was that of the
Periodical comment seems to be fairly uniform in its condemnation of the interpretations of the Acts of 1917 and 1918. Chafee is an
outstanding example, but other commentators, such as Carroll and
Willis, concur wholeheartedly with his general views, if not with his
sensational approach.
" 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. ed. 877 (1877); 143 U. S. 110, 36 L. ed. 93,
12 Sup. Ct. 304 (1392). See also Champion v. Ames, 133 U. S. 321,
47 L. ed. 492, 23 Sup. Ct. 321 (1903).
' , See for a discussion of this argument, and of the collateral points
of conspiracy, treason, and presidential censorship, T. F. Carroll,
F,ecdowm of , peech in War Time-The Esplonage Act, 17 Mich. L. Rev.
021 (1919).
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policy behind them. It was widely felt that a dangerous political precedent had been set, and that a step had been taken backward from the principles fought for in the Revolution, regardless
of the constitutional interpretation of the acts. On the other
hand, it was pointed out, sterner measures had been adopted
during the Civil War against those who were dangerous or disaffected, by the Executive, without Congressional sanction. Only
about five per cent as many were prosecuted under the Espionage
Act, as were held in military prisons without trial and without
charges, during the Civil War, with popular acquiescence. Wartime measures are necessary harsh, because of national emergency
and whatever be the legal rules involved, they will, whether or
not they ought to, give way before a paramount need. One of
those needs is for a population pulling in one harness; and since
liberty of speech and of the press, freely exercised, may cause
disloyal actions, that liberty must be restricted in war time. Of
course, it was recognized, there was no actual curb on the press
as such during the Civil War, due to Lincoln's feeling against
such action. But the lesson is none the less plain because it
lacks a symmetrical structure, and the previous relaxation of the
constitutional provision was not complete. The lesson to be
drawn from history is threefold: First, freedom of the press
means freedom of the press, other things being equal; second,
'war does make a difference," and in wartime disloyal acts must
be curbed; and third, "words are not only tble keys of persuasion,
but the trigger of action," and words may properly be suppressed under proper circumstances. The rest-the lesson of the
Espionage Acts and the cases under it and similar acts-is a
matter of application, and of determining what are proper
circumstances. 56
It may be noted in conclusion that procedural matters, and
the form in which cases are decided, as well as the time of their
decision, affect these decisions, and by weight of numbers affect
the law as much as individual rules. In United States v. Stokes, 6A
the defendant was committed under the Espionage Act for this
statement in a newspaper "I am for the people and the Government is for the profiteers."
The case was never appealed. It is
" See for a partisan discussion of the sedition legislation, Chafee,
Freedom of Speech, (N. Y. 1920).
5ABull. Dept. of Justice (1918).

FREEDOm oF THK

PRESS

extremely doubtful whether the conviction would have been sustained by the "clear and present danger" Court or even by the
"remote tendency" Court. 'Who can say what the effect on the
law would have been of an appeal of the Masses case ? A purely
fortuitous circumstance-the coincidence of the publication in
question and the assassination of AMcKinley-caused the prosecution and the conviction in People v. Most.57 What would have
been the result of an appeal to the Supreme Court ? No discussion of this phase of the problem has been found, and it is not
purposed to do more here than to indicate it, without idle speculation on a matter not on the direct point at issue, which has been
settled so far as actual decisions in the books are concerned.
Contempt of court has been an angle, from which slight limitations on the doctrine of freedom of the press have been made;
the general classification of the offenses so punished is sedition or
"political libel", it seems, but a separate word may be said in
connection with this particular phase of the matter. The First
Amendment, of course, affords no protection against this type of
restraint; neither does the Fourteenth. Yet as often as the judicial power of summary punishment for "constructive" contempt
arises, objections of liberal-minded men are voiced, leading, in
many cases, to legislation on the subject, which, however, seems
to be no permanent cure. The practice has been rather common
in state courts, and many cases support the right to do so, 5s in
spite of Mr. Justice Holmes' slighting remarks about a judge who
would let the conduct of his court be affected by a newspaper
publication. The chief criticism seems to be that such action
revives old Star Chamber practices, and violates the right of trial
by jury.
The doctrines of constructive contempt seems to have been
distinctively American, going back to the early Federalist judges,
such as M.cKeean of Pennsylvania."
Among early examples
171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175 (1902). See also Coleman v. McLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908). The Stokes case is reported
and discussed in Bull. Dept. Justice (1918); 106, no official report was
found. See for an earlier application of state laws, Commonwealth v.
Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 59 N. E. 55 (1901).
0 See McDougall v. Sheridan, 23 Idaho 191, which collects authorities for the action taken.
11See Hummel v. Bishoff, 9 Watts 425 (Pa. 1841), showing a similar
tendency, in spite of the trouble McKeean and others had after Oswald's
case, infra, n. 60.

KENTuCY LAw JOuRNAL

may be cited Oswald's case, and Passmore's case. 60 The most
notorious case, however, was the severe punishment of Lawless,
by Judge Peck, in frontier Missouri, in 1826. Among the political repercussions of this case were a Federal statute, declaratory
of the inherent limits of summary power under the Constitution,
and the impeachment of Judge Peck. He failed of conviction,
probably for personal reasons, but it is worthy of note that of the
few judges ever impeached in Congress, such a large proportion
were those who had transgressed the right of freedom of speech.
Paterson and Chase are, of course, outstanding examples, under
the Sedition Act, but Judge Peek's case is no less significant,
especially in connection with the prompt passage of the statute
delimiting punishment possible for the offenses involved in the
Lawless case.'
The Buchanan Act of 1831 checked the practice of judicial
punishment of contempt by publication, even in the state courts,
until its revival in 1855, by Judge English, in Arkansas, in the
case of State v. Morrill.62 Judge English even intimates, in this
opinion, that a publication scandalizing a court may not be pardoned by the executive, raising a nice point of separation of
powers.
The leading case in the Supreme Court on this point is
Patterson v. Colorado."3 In that case Senator Patterson was
committed under a summary criminal process, for an article published in a Denver newspaper. The court refused to let him
show the truth of his publication. The Supreme Court refused,
over the vigorous protest of Brewer and Harlan, to reverse under
the Fourteenth Amendment. An interesting angle of the opinion
is that it construes the First Amendment to apply only to previous censorship, under the Blackstonian theory. This construction is clearly wrong, under the decisions of the Court, but it is
not so clear that the First Amendment should have been the
turning point of the case. The facts raise a serious question of
due process, it seems, which the Court dodged entirely, as is
pointed out in the dissenting opinions. It is probable that a
O Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dallas 319 (U. S. 1788); Respublica v.
Passmore, 3 Yeates 441 (Pa. 1809).
6'See Nelles & King Contempt by Publication in the United States
for an account of this very interesting episode in American History.
16 Axk. 384 (1855).
Is205 U. S. 454, 51 L. ed. 879, 27 Sup. Ct. 556 (1907).
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right of Federal review on that point would be recognized now.
6
A later case was United States v. Toledo Newspaper Co. 4
which raised several new issues, and seems to have brought the
law to its present state. The publication involved was one of the
Toledo News-Bee intimating bias on the part of the judge in
favor of traction interests, in a suit against the city. The Judge
overruled the early construction of the Federal Contempt statute, although it was contemporary, and had stood for over eight
years. That construction, in Ex parte Poulson,65 while deploring the effect of the statute, held that the meaning was clear that
a publication out of court could not be punished under the "so
near" clause of the statute. This construction was approved
6
forty years later, by the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Robinson,"
where it was held that the summary power of a lower Federal
court could be exercised only . . . "to insure order and
decorum in their presence." Judge Killis, in the Toledo case,
said that the construction in the Poulson case read into the statute an exception (to the summary power) which was contrary to
public policy, and that the Robinson case, with its "topographical
propinquity" test, had been overruled by a failure to review in a
07
later case.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Judge in the Toledo case;
the decision has since been strongly criticizd by many writers, 68
and Mr. Justice Holmes delivered a dissent that has been more
quoted, probably, than the rule of the case, saying:
"But a judge of the United States is expected to be a man of ordinary

firmness of character. . PA
(There was nothing) in the case that would have affected a mind
of reasonable fortitude, [or] that obstructed the administration of
justice in any sense that I possibly can give to these words.%

The case is still law, however, and may remain so. Its best
chance of reversal, in United States v. Craig,69 failed, perhaps
6"247 U. S. 402, 62 L. ed. 1186, 38 Sup. Ct. 560 (1918).
¢z19 Fed. Cas., No. 11, 350 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1835). Ex Parte Poulson. n,22 Wallace
505 (U. S. 1873). See also U. S. v. Shipp,
203 U. S.
506, 51 L. ed. 292, 27 Sup. Ct. 161 (1906).
"220 Fed. 458 (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1915).
0Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in
Crimintal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts (1924), 37 Harv. L.
Rev. 1010.
-A 247 U. S. 402, 424 (1917).
1's Id. at 425.
0266 Fed. 230 (S. D. N. Y. 1920), 279 Fed. 900 (S. D. N. Y. 1921),
263 U. S. 255, 68 L. ed. 293, 44 Sup. Ct. 103 (1923).
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because of accidental factors which prevented its being very
severely contested.70 Subsequent Federal cases have applied the
doctrine to the limit of the Toledo rule, and state courts seem to
have swung into the practice.
An example of a state commitment for contempt under a Constitution even more liberal than the standard Hamiltonian type7 '
is State v. Frew,7 2 decided by the West Virginia Court in 1884.
The court followed the Arkaaas rule, and did not attempt to fit
the facts of the publication into any "so near" test such as was
prescribed for Federal Courts. Other state decisions show
similar cases, although they were relatively rare after the Federal
Statute, until the Toledo decision, when almost all the states fell
into line within a few years. There is a definite policy against
"trial by newspapers", which may give weight to the rule of
punishment by summary process for contempt by such publications, ad the rule may be here to stay.7 3 However, many
liberals, who appear to be in the driver's seat at present, have
committed themselves to a view of freedom of the press which is
irreconcilable with such a power, and the probabilities are that if
such a case is carried to the Supreme Court soon, or if the matter
is again brought to the attention of Congress, steps will be taken
74
to curtail, if not to destroy, the rule of contempt by publication
expressed in the Toledo case.
Two of the prominent exceptions to the general doctrine of
freedom of the press, balsphemy and libel, involve other considerations than that of the personal liberty to such an extent as
to make a detailed study of them here, unprofitable and out of
place. It may be well, however, to consider them briefly, in order
to indicate the nature of the problems involved.
The topic of blasphemous publications is a difficult one to
deal with accurately. It is complicated by the guarantee of religious freedom as well as by that of freedom of the press. There
'0 Craig relied on habeas corpus when he should have appealed; an
intervening presidential pardon took the wind out of the habeas corpus
proceeding.
2W. Va. Const. (1872), Act. III, sec. 7.
1.24 W. Va. 416 (1884).
1 See for comments on "Trial by Newspaper", Brown, Some Points
on the Law of the Press, 95 Central L. J. 59 (1922); Taft, The Press
and the Courts, 58 Am. L. Rev. 595 (1924).
"I See Nelles & King, op. cit. supra, n. 61. But see Mattison,
Restraints on Freedom of the Press, 13 Marquette L. Rev. 1 (1928) on
Trial by Newspapers.
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is always in such cases strong political pressure in favor of overriding the guarantees, as well as that in the opposite direction;
and the authorities are almost all English cases, not worth quite
their face value in this country due to the different constitutional
background, and the different religious set-up there where there
is an official church as contrasted with the many approximately
equivalent sects here. The best treatment that can be made of
the subject is an analysis of the English cases, plus an estimate
of their probable application here, in the light of our constitutional provisions.
The central question in the law of blasphemy seems to be
whether a requirement of Christianity, or of respect for Christianity, or for any specific Church, or of respect for and abstinence from criticism of religion and church, in general, is a part of
the law. The avowal of the constitutional guarantee of the
American, and of the constitutional liberty of the Englishman,
would seem to be that it is not, today, if it ever was, under the
more rigid regime of two centuries ago. The exception to this
guarantee, with respect to blasphemy, moves the line between
required, or unpunishable conduct, and forbidden, punishable
conduct, just part of the way back up the scale.
Because of the nature of the judicial system in England,
the statements of the Justices in the cases may be considered of
more actual importance than the results thereof. A case under
the Federal Constitution would decide that a specific offense was
or was not punishable, and the statements in the opinion might be
considered of greater or less importance depending upon the
writer, and of surrounding circumstances. The English cases
which we have to consider involved selections from the following
questions to be submitted to the jury: (1) Did the defendant
make any statements at variance with the creed of the Anglican
Church ? (2) Did the defendant make obscene statements concerning religion or the Church?, and intermediate charges, or
taking the case from the jury. Their statements are valuable,
then, as amounting to charges of the state of the Law of England.
In Shore v. Wson 75 Erskine, J. stated the law thus:
"It is indeed still blasphemy, punishable at common law, scoffingly
or irreverently to ridicule the doctrine of the Christian faith, and no
one would be allowed to give or to claim any pecuniary encouragement
9 Clark & F. 355 (1839).

L. J.-3

KmNTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
for any such purpose; yet any man may, without subjecting himself to
penal consequences, soberly and reverently examine and question the
truth of those doctrines which have been assumed as essential to it."

The question was one of the law of trusts, involving a charitable
gift for the purpose of scientific inquiries into the truth of
Christian dogma. The trust was upheld. This decision did not,
of course, bear on the question of criminal prosecution directly,
but it threw into some doubt the decisions in Rex v. Wooston,76
and allied cases, refusing to permit any argument that Christianity might be wrong. That view of the law of blasphemy, stated
by Lord Hale, who said that "Christianity is parcel of the laws
of England", persisted, until definitely killed by Bowman v. The
Secular Society, Ltd.,77 in 1917.
The leading case in favor of a more moderate view of the law
was Regina v. Ramsey and Foote,78 decided by a trial court in
1883. The prosecution was dismissed after the charge rendered,
so of course, no appeal was taken, and the case did not become an
authority binding on all English courts, until affirmed in the
Bowman case, which made it Constitutional law. Coleridge,
L. C. J., laid down the rule in that case as follows:
"If the decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamenttals of religion may be attacked without a person being guilty of
blasphemous libel. There are many great and grave writers, who have
attacked the foundations of Christianity . . . I think it a good law
persons should be obliged to respect the feelings and opinions of those
among whom they live ... in a Catholic country we have no right to
insult Catholic opinion, nor in a Mohammedan country, have we any
right to insult Mohammedan opinion. I differ from both, but I am
bound as a good citizen to treat with respect opinions with which I
do not agree."'A

The authoritative statement of the House of Lords was made
in Bowman v. The Secular Society, in 1917. The Justices were
agreed that the law still was, or ought to be (there were no prior,
binding precedents of the House) what it was in the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries, when apostasy was a crime, and an
irreverent reference to preaching blasphemy. The historical
background, however, gave the house some difficulty. They did
not wish to admit that they were changing the law, or to point
out where the change took place, but there was no blinking the
fact that a change in the law had taken place. It has been sug'61 Barn. K. B. 162 (1729).
(1917) A. C. 406.
"15
Cox Crim. Cas. 231 (1883).
8
1 A (1917)
A. C. 406, -I
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gested7 9 that the decision would have been more easily arrived at,
had there been no precedents at all on the problem. At any rate,
the case settled that "scurrility or indecency is an essential element of the crime of balspbiemy at common law", and "to constitute blasphemy at common law, there must be such an element
of vilification, ridicule or irreverence as would be likely to exasperate the feelings of others and so lead to a breach of the peace."
Another statement,80 also embodying the rather new "breach of
the peace" notion, was that "the offense is associated
with violent, offensive, or indecent words, . . . the common
law of England does not render criminal the mere propagation
of doctrines hostile to the Christian faith. The crime consists
in the manner in which the doctrines are advocated," an even
stricter test, it seems, than Lord Coleridge's "wilful misrepresentation or artful sophistry, calculated to mislead the ignorant
and unwary. "
The law in America is probably that the Constitution Vill
protect the individual against any statute of the Federal government more severe than the English present-day common-law rule.
The test has not been directly applied to the First Amendment,
but authorities under the religious freedom clause indicate a
similar attitude.81 State constitutions on the point vary, but
the general rule is not far from that stated above. West Virginia
has a specific constitutional provision protecting the right to profess and to argue religious opinions.8 2 There is, also, in West
Virginia an obscene publications law, and a constitutional provision making insulting language punishable,8 3 which, it seems,
could lead to no other dividing line in blasphemous publications
than that announced in the Bowman case, which is the commonsense rule of today,8 4 and in accord with the rules of the state
85
blasphemy cases on the books.
"Lee The Law of Blasphemy, 16 Mich. a. Rev. 149, 153 (1918).
80Reg. v. Ramsay & Foote, supra, n. 78.

" See for discussions of the distinctions Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S.

333, 33 L. ed. 637, 10 Sup. Ct. 299 (1890); Mormon Church v. U. S.,
136 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 478, 10 Sup. Ct. 792 (1890).
W. Va. Const. (1872), Art. In, see. 15.
1W. Va. Const. (1872), Art. III, sec. 7. W. Va. Rev. Code (1931),

c. 55, Art. 7, sec. 2.
"See for a discussion of the Bowman case Lee, The Law of

Blasohemy,
16 Mich. L. Rev. 149 (1918).
M
Conn. v. Updegraph, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa. 1824) 394, State v.
Chandler, 2 Harr (Del. 1837) 553, Conn. v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. (Mass.
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The exception to the right of freedom of speech., in cases of
defamatory libel, cannot well be dealt with from a general point
of view, with any applicability to West Virginia law. The English common law divided "libels" into four classes, embracing,
generally, all the exceptions noted to liberty of the press, i. e.,
defamatory, seditious, blasphemous, and obscene libels. The only
one now included in the category is defamatory libel, for which
a civil remedy was permitted at common law, while resort must
be had to the criminal law to reach the others. Various tests as
to the existence of a libel were applied at common law, the chief
one being the tendency of the publication to create and diffuse a
bad opinion of the personal or professional reputation of the person referred to. Erskine, J. thought the test ought to be "criminal intent", as a question for the jury. That test was rejected
by the court in the Dean of St. Asaph's (ase,8 6 in 1784, the
question being held one of law. Fox's Libel Act followed soon
afterward, in 1792,87 and provided that for a verdict both judge
and jury must be convinced of the libelous character of the
publication.
In America, Hamilton in his model state constitution set up
a test similar to that advocated by Erskine: The "good motives,
for justifiable ends" excuse for publishing true matter, found in
most state constitutions today. Jefferson, who was President
when Hamilton argued Croswell's Case, agreed with him, and
professed to find that test in the common law, but that seems to
be at best doubtful.
Today, in America, the libel problem is chiefly one of varying state law. There could be no Federal statute on the subject
of defamatory libel, it seems, except as to exclusion from the
mails, and similar restraints of a purely Federal character, and
it sems at least arguable that the power to impose such restraints
is arbitrary. The First Amendment, of course, does not affect
state laws, and the Fourteenth Amendment, it seems would not
affect a state libel law as such, unless it violated some specific
canon of due process.
1838) 206, State v. Ruggles, 8 Johns Rep. (N. Y.) 290 (1811), are the
leading cases on the subject.
10Rex v. Shipley, 4 Douglas 73 (1784).
S The judge still decides as to matters arising from the face of the
publication, however; Hunt v. Star Newspaper Co. (1908), 2 K. B. 309;
Dakyl v. Lalunchere (1908), 2 K. B. 325, settle that point, as to modern
English law.
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State constitutional provisions vary considerably, although
most of them apply the Hamiltonian test of "truth, with good
motives for justifiable ends", to all publications, private as well
as public. A few states still have a copy of the Federal provision in their constitutions. The West Virginia provision is not
like that of any of the others, if the "insulting words" provision
be considered.
The true meaning and application of the provision for the
defense of truth, with good motives, for justifiable ends, seems
not to have been decided. Some judicial semi-constructions,
however, have been renderd. The Kansas court, under a Hamiltonian constitution, announced a doctrine which would permit
defamatory falsehood if published in the belief that it was true.8 8
This same rule exists elsewhere, although qualified by limiting it
to publications that circulate only within the state or election district, if it is a libel on a candidate for public office.
The Pennsylvania constitution provides that no conviction
shall be had for libel relating to men in public capacity, if such
publication was not "voluntarily or negligently made." The
court held this to apply only to criminal actions.8 9 Later, however, a broader rule, approximating that of Kansas, was laid
down. 0o Other cases talk of "balancing conflicting interests",
and "drawing a line between the needs and good of society and
the right of an individual to enjoy a good reputation." It seems
that just where the line should be drawn should remain a question of the law, and not of constitutional construction.
The West Virginia Constitution provides specifically for the
punishment of libel, for civil liability. 91 The truth, "publishxed
92
with good motives, and for justifiable ends" is made a defence.
A further statutory provision is that evidence of the truth, or of
an apology, may be offered in mitigation of damages.9 3 Insulting
8Coleman v. McLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908), supra,
n. 57.
10Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. St. 385 (1878).
"Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404 (1886).
1W. Va. Const. 1872), Art. III, sec. 7. Sweeney v. Baker,
13 W. Va. 158 (1878), and State v. Frew, 24 W. Va. 416 (1884), contain

discussions of the limitation on the doctrine of freedom of the press,
in the case of libelous matter.
" W. Va. Cost. (1872), Art. III, see. 8. See Michaelson v. Turk,
79 W. Va. 31, 90 S. E. 395 (1916).
NW. Va. Rev. Code (1931), c. 57, Art 2, see. 4.
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words are made actionable as a "breach of the peace.'" 14 These
provisions make the law, while not clearer as to interpretation
than in other jurisdictions, much more nearly delimited by statute than in other common law states.
In addition to the defence of truth, that of conditional
privilege is often invoked in newspaper libel cases. Reports of
public proceedings, such as sessions of the legislature, courtroom
trials, are privileged if fair and true, because of the public
interest in having such proceedings open, which is considered to
be of greater importance than the individual's interest in not
being defamed. The widespread complaint against "trial by
newspapers" is directed to libelous statements made by such
publications concerning parties to public proceedings, as well as
to partisan accounts tending to obstruct the administration of
justice by the courts. However, the abuse of this privilege by
so-called "yellow" journals, so long as it does not violate the
canons against contempt or obscenity, is not likely to be visited
with serious consequences, nor to lead to any restrictions on
such accounts generally. The general sentiment seems to be
in favor of such publicity, in this country, although similar
practices are not always found elsewhere. 95
Abuses of the privilege of true publications concerning
public figures grew to. such a point that a new doctrine was
urged upon the courts-that of the "right of privacy."
It
seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that a man should be
able to appeal to a court to protect his interest in not having
his private affairs or his picture published for all the world to
see, but the courts have been slow to adopt this view, although
96
it is a growing one.
Another outgrowth of the increasing complications of the
law of libel has been the granting of injunctive relief in equity
where it appears that a property interest (other than the
plaintiff's "good name" alone) will be injured by the
anticipated publication. This has been attacked on the ground
1W. Va. Const. (1872), Art. III, sec. 8, supra, n. 83.
0 Criminal and other judicial proceedings appear not to be nearly
as fully reported in England and on the Continent as in this country.

See Beman, Censorship of Speech and the Press (N. Y. 1930), for some

valuable non-technical material on the problem.
"Pavesich v. N. Eng. L. Ins. Co., 122 Va. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905),

is the leading case for recovery.
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that an injunction is a "previous restraint" on freedom of the
press,07 and that granting relief in equity violates the policy in
favor of trial by jury in libel cases. 98 It seems clear under the
authorities today that if no clearly defined property right is
involved, equity will not intervene merely to protect an interest
of personality, standing alone, against injury by apprehended
scurrilous publications. 99 It is evident from these examples
that the application of the constitutional guarantee of liberty of
the press to the law of libel has become a much more complicated legal problem than it was in the time of Hamilton,
even if the common law of libel is not much different from
what it was at the time of CrosweZl's Case.10 0
A side-light on the legal problems connected with liberty of
the press has been its application to labor disputes. Individuals
being picketed have claimed, without great success, that the
signs carried by picketers were libels; labor leaders, on the other
hand, while denying that their signs contained statements of
fact which might be, if untrue, libelous, argued that injunctions
against strikes, when extended to signs and publications such as
"Unfair", abridged their constitutional right of liberty of the
press. That argument failed in Gompers v. Buck's Stove and
Range Co., 10 but it is submitted that in view of the state of
flux in which labor law is at present, the issue is not yet clear,
and if anti-injunction legislation is repealed, courts may extend
the protection of the First Amendment to the signs of picketing
strikers. It is clear, of course, that where the First Amendment
goes, the law of libel should go, and the constitutional protection
should carry with it a corresponding legal liabilty.
In concluding these references to the law of libel and its
connection with our subject, it may be pointed out that the

"See Chafee, op. cit., supra, n. 11. See Lovell v. City of Griffin,

303 U. S. 444 (1938), on the prior restraint problem.
Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation, infra, n. 99.
" Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, No. 4901 (C. C. D. Mass. 1841),
and Dixon v. Holden, 7 Eq. Cas. 488 (1889), indicate the possibility of
injunctive relief, in spite of the doctrine of freedom of the press. See
Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation, 29 Harvard L. Rev. 640
(1915).
I People v. Croswell, 3 Johns Cas. 337, involving an alleged libel
on Jefferson.
10,221 U. S. 418, 55 L. ed. 797, 31 Sup. Ct. 492 (1911). See also on
the general problem Marx & Haas Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133,
67 S.W. 391 (1002). It does not seem to have been dealt with in law
review comment.
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conclusion drawn from libel cases should not be applied to the
other exceptions to the freedom of the press rule, because the
libel law stands alone in dealing with publications affecting
private persons, and not to those affecting society generally.
It is difficult to distinguish the utterances in many libel cases
from those involving obscenity, blasphemy, or even sedition
unless this division, expressed in the celebrated Chicago Trib ine
case, 10 2 where the city of Chicago tried to sue a newspaper for
03
libel, is kept in mind.
The censorship of obscene and immoral writing forms an
important part of this subject today, although there was a
time not too long ago when it did not. There is some question
as to whether the publication of obscene writings was punishable,
at common law, but most cases indicate that it was. 10 4 There
are today Federal statutes making it a crime to send obscene
and indecent matter through the mails, and granting the Postmaster-General authority to exercise a previous restraint by
excluding such matter from the mails without trial. 0 5 This
latter power has been extended even to newspapers which contained obscene matter only incidentally.' 0 6 There are also
obscenity statutes in almost all states making such publications
criminal. West Virginia has such a statute, under express
Constitutional authorityloT
The problem has become of greater importance in recent
decades, because of the construction of such statutes to forbid
publications on such matters as social disease and birth control,
as to which certain groups of intellectual liberals wished to
educate the public. The fight on these subjects between the
'"Never appealed; see Brown, Law of the Press, 95 Central L. J. 59

(1922).

2-3Limiting libel cases to suits by individuals. But see State v.
Pioneer Press, 100 Minn. 193, 110 N. W. 869 (1907), and similar language
elsewhere.
'-0 Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 788 (1795); Rex. v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527
(1770), Schroeder, Obscene Literature and Constitutional Law (1911),
takes the opposite position. See ch. 3, op. cit.
35 Statutes 1149; 36 Stat. 1139 U. S. Code, Title 18, sec. 334. See
also Title 19, sec. 135, as to the importation of obscene matter.
0 U. S. v. Burnell, 75 Fed. 824 (S. D. Ia. 1896); Anderson v. Patten,
247 Fed. 382 (S. D. N. Y. 1917); Burleson v. U. S. ex rel. Workman's
Coop. Pub. Co., 260 U. S. 757, 67 L. ed. 499, 43 Sup. Ct. 246 (1921),
affirming 287 Fed. 418.
3'W. Va- Const. (1872), Art. III, sec. 8; Rev. Code (1931), c. 61,

Art. 8, see. 11.
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medical groups and the Sangerites, who wished to disseminate
the propaganda of their social doctrines over the country, and
the conservative groups who wished to prevent such education,
was carried for several rounds into the courts, as to the initial
validity of existing obscenity statutes under the Constitution,
as to their application to these publications, and as to the validity
of new statutes constructed for the specific purpose of limiting
such publications. The ethical issues involved were subjected
to considerable further complications by the remarkable
"mushroom growth", after the World War, of immoral and
obscene magazines and sensational and super-sensational newspapers. Many of these problems did not reach the courts, but
the problems of the legislator and of the citizen must be re10s
membered, even if they cannot be answered in this study.
The difficulty of deciding whether any particular publication falls within the definition of the words "obscene" and
"indecent" has caused various tests to be adopted by the courts.
Perhaps the most widely used device is a division of all published
matter into three classes-that which is not obscene as a matter
of law, that which is questionable matter for the jury to decide,
and that which is obscene as a matter of law. Then in litigation
involving any questioned publication, the court decides into
which class it falls, and instructs a verdict if it is in the first or
last group. If it is doubtful, the jury decides whether or not
it is punishable. 10 9 This method of determination, of course,
applies only to criminal prosecutions, and not to such restraints
as exclusion from the mails, where the postmaster-general makes
a final, though reviewable, decision. 1 0
No standard test, either for the court or the jury, as to
obscenity, has been worked out; however, in instructions to
juries, and in disputed classifications, language has been used
which indicates fairly clearly what the test will be. One
statement, much quoted, was that the test of obscenity is
"whether the tendency of the publication is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences
2*$See an outline of the problem in E. W. Mandeville, "Gutter
Literature", New Republic, XLV, 350, Feb. 17, 1926; Whibley, "The
Yellow Newspaper", Blackwoods CLXXXI, 531, April, 1907.
1* U. S. v. Harmon, 45 Fed. 414 (D. Nev. 1891), 50 Fed. 921
(C. C. D. Kan. 1892); U. S. v. Journal Co. 197 Fed. 415 (E. D. Va.
1912); Depart v. U. S., 4 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 5th Cir. 925).

" Anderson v. Patten, 247 Fed. 382 (S. D. N. Y. 1917), supra, n. 106.
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and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.",."
Many courts, especially in recent years, have attempted to limit
the meaning of the term to include that which is lubricous and
suggestive, but not that which is merely vulgar, improper, or
even scatological."12 It has been suggested, in the light of such
cases, which strain the dictionary definition of obscenity, that
the statutes making it an offense should be redefined, to punish
pornography, rather than mere obscenity.
A celebrated example of the application of the test mentioned
was United States v. One Book Called "Ulysees". 118 There
Joyce's book got a good review in the opinion of the court, as
well as a great deal of publicity which undoubtedly tended to
increase its circulation. Judge Woolsey, who had previously
approved sexual expositions in United States v. One Book called
"Married Love", 14 and United States v. One Book Called "Contraception' 1 5 found in the Ulysses case also that the book was
not written with pornographic intent, saying: "In spite of its
unusual frankness, I do not detect anywhere the leer of the
sensualist. "116 The attacks on new books written in a modern
ultra-frank manner began to dwindle after a succession of such
cases, because those investigating them saw that if they failed,
as they seemed likely to, under such loose enforcement of the
statutes, the book would be in a much stronger position than if
it had been completely ignored. So the later tendency seems to
be to ignore completely the cheap products of some modern
novelists, rather than to try to suppress them.
An odd sidelight on the fight against obscenity has been
the attempts to bar many books of long standing, or those by
authors widely known and respected. Prosecutions of such soInRegina v. Hicklin, L. R., 3 Q. B. 360 (1868), a similar test is laid
down in Dysart v. U. S., 4 F. (2d) 765 (C.C. A. 5th Cir. 925), supra,
n. 109.
nU. S. v. Klauder, 240 Fed. 501 (N. D. N. Y. 1917); Swearingen
v. U. S., 161 U. S. 446, 40 L. ed. 765, 16 Sup. Ct. 562. See for other
distinctions People v. Eastman, 188 N. Y. 478, 81 N. E. 459 (1907'),
Knowles v. U. S., 170 Fed. 409 (C. C. A. 8th 1909), Coomer v. U. S.,
213 Fed. 1 (1914).
asI5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. N. Y. 1'933). The case is noted in 2 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 516 (1934).
='48 Fed. (2d) 821 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
"551 Fed. (2d) 525 (S.D. N. Y. 1931). See also Dunlop v. U. S.,
165 U. S.446, 41 L. ed. 799, 17 Sup. Ct. 375 (1897).
I"See U. S. v. Dennett, 39 F. (2d) 564 (C.C. A. 2d Cir. 1930),
where a book called the "Sex Side of Life" was held not obscene,
because of its "dignified and conscientious" tone.
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called "classics" have been most frequent under the comparatively strict New York statute, affecting the comparatively
active New York book market. The most striking effect has
been to bring a large and representative, if not complete, list of
such books to the attention of the reading public.' 17 Other
localities have banned large numbers of the classics, quietly and
in general without court proceedings, but such practices cannot be studied in detail here, nor can the effect of unofficial
enforcement agencies, such as the Legion of Decency and the
resulting Hays Censorship in Hollywood under the motion
picture code. Such unofficial agencies may be restrained if they
become too obvious in their restraints on theoretically free
publications. Such a case was the Watch and Ward Society in
Boston, which met its nemesis when it caused the American
Mfercury to be barred by dealers. 1 8
Publication by newspapers of full and accurate accounts
of public proceedings, under a conditional privilege as to libel,
may not include obscene matter. However, accurate reports
of court proceedings are generally held not punishable, no matter
how obscene they may be. 1 9 It is submitted that this is an
unfortunate result. The general realization of that fact has led
to the enactment of many statutes specifically prohibiting the
publication of newspapers devoted to the publication of criminal
news, police reports, or pictures and stories of such things.
Such statutes have generally been held constitutional. An out20
standing exception was the famous case of Near v. Minnesota,
decided in 1931, in which Mir. Chief Justice Hughes wrote an
exhaustive treatise on the whole topic of freedom of the press
as applied to libel and obscenity cases, in condemning a Minnesota statute providing for the enjoining of obscene or
17Anderson v. Patten, 247 Fed. 382 (S. D. N. Y. 1917), supra, n. 106;
Halsey v. N. Y. Society, 234 N. Y. 1 (1922); People v. Seltzer, 203
N. Y. S. 809 (Sup. CL 1924); People v. Pesky, 243 N. Y. 193, 153 N. E.
45 (1930). See Grant & Angoff, Massachusetts Censorship, 10 Boston
Univ. L. Rev. 147 (1930).
w American Mercury v. Chase, 13 F. (2d) 224 (D. Mass. 1926).
noCommonwealth v. Herald Pub. Co., 128 Ky. 424, 108 S. W. 892
(1908); U. S. v. Journal Co., 197 Fed. 415 (1912), supra, n. 109.
"'283 U. S. 697, 75 L. ed. 1357, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931). The statute
involved was 1 Minn. Stat. (1927) 10123-(1)-(3). Cases involving
similar statutes are State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18 (1900); In re Banks,
36 Kan. 242, 42 Pac. 693 (1895), and State v. Warren, 113 N. C. 683,
holding the statutes constitutional.
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scandalous and defamatory newspapers as nuisances. The case
was argued, decided, and fought back and forth through the
periodicals for many months before the Supreme Court rendered
its decision, five to four. The statute, unpopular with those who
at the time needed some ground on which to wave the flag in
their editorial columns, was generally known as the Mfinnesota
Gag Law; however, it seems clear as a historical matter that
the statute was passed not to curb the decent press, but to combat
a social evil, and that there was little ground for the fear that
the law would be applied improperly. Of course, if the law
made abuses possible, it is no argument to say that the incumbent officials would not take advantage of such possibilities;
but the statute in the Near -ase seems not to have been directed
to any but the very yellow and very degraded sheets. As Mr.
Justice Butler points out in his dissent, the act did not provide
for a previous restraint in the proper sense of the world; previous restraint in the Blackstonian sense, and in that used by
most current writers, connotes an administrative control in
advance, such as that formerly exercised by licensers and censors,
and does not include a possibility of an advance restraint in
equity.
It has been suggested that the rule of the Near case may
apply to such Federal restraints as the Radio Act, but such a
result is highly improbable. 12 1 The Near case, while not criticized, is not likely to be extended on the type of legislation there
involved, clearly for a proper police purpose. The rule is much
more likely to be extended in other directions, to more subtle
laws such as the Louisiana newspaper tax, which hit all powerful
newspapers, and thus created a government club over the
22
press.1
In concluding the discussion of obscenity, it may be pointed
out that in recent years two elements have grown considerably:
The tendency toward greater control over the scandalous publications has advanced, and has been checked by a partial conflict
in practical application with the movement for greater liberality
See Note, Previous Restraints on Freedom of Speech, 31 Columbia

L. Rev. 1148 (1931), for a discussion of Near v. Minnesota, and similar
"previous restraints."
2-2See Deutsch & Kerrigan & Burke, Memorandum on Newspaper
Advertising Bill, New Orleans, 1934; a parallel problem in Lovel v.
Griffin, 305 U. S. 444 (1938), supra, n. 97.
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with respect to such matters as birth control literature. The
result of the conflict seems to have been a gradual victory for
the forces of "Frankness, be it harmful or helpful". The issue
has become much more argued as an everyday matter even
than that of sedition, and political comment, although the latter
would seem to be more nearly a matter of fundamental necessity.
Ardent advocates of complete freedom, such as Schroeder,
who contends that any linitation on obscenity is unconstitutional, 123 and Chafee, who contends that almost any limitation
on communication of any sort is unconstitutional, 124 have been
much more vociferous than the forces ranged against them who
cry "To the pure..." and try to keep their society in a state of
relative purity, rather than to risk general contamination by
general education. It is of course dangerous to predict the final
outcome of the struggle, but in 1939 it looks as if, so far as
obscenity is concerned, liberty of the press is in the
ascendant.
In concluding this study many things might be said. The
tendency is for discussions of the doctrine of liberty of the
press, and of the limitations thereon, to point out that there
are such limitations, couching the conclusions so reached in such
glittering and poetical general terms that it seemed that they had
been drawn from the very heart of the law, instead of being
merely an elementary statement of the nature of the subject
under discussion. Other works tend to close with a flag-waving
oration in favor of the Constitution and all that it stands for, as
indicated by the cases discussed, or as not indicated, but shamefully neglected, by those cases, as to this study, after a prolonged
examination of the trees composing this forest. The author's
view of the general panorama has become so obscured that it
seems difficult to paint it in a few words. To be sure, others
say that the right of freedom of the press exists; they say that
it is limited, however, by the fine distinction between liberty
2OObscene Literature and Constitutional Law, (N. Y. 1911). The
book purports to be "a forensic defense of freedom of the press," and

certainly Is nothing more, so far as legal analysis is concerned. The
book comes much closer to being a history of obscenity than of the
constitutional law of the subject.
12Freedom of Speech, supra, n. 56, and various articles in the
Harvard L. Rev. See, for general discussions of the law of Obscenity:
Balter, Some Observations Concerning the Federal Obscenity Statutes,
8 So. Calif. L. Rev. 267 (1935), and The Enforcement of the Laws
against Obscenity in N~ew York, 28 Columbia L. Rev. 950 (1928).
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and license. It is difficult to fit all cases into this dichotomy.
The line does not appear clear, on one side of which a publication is protected by the doctrine, Constitutional or otherwise, of
liberty of the press, and on the other side of which it is punishable, nay preventable. Let it be said here merely that there
appear to be many authorities on limitations on the doctrine we
are studying, and that there is no clarity in the cases as to just
125
the extent of those limitations.
A further respect in which the examination of the trees in
this forest has obscured the vision of the student, is that it is
now found impossible to divide the trees into two classes, and
to say that those facing in one direction are bulwarks of our
society, while those facing in the opposite direction are a menace
to that society, and of questionable ethical background. I challenge anyone to say either that freedom of the press ought to
be made absolute, or that it ought to be limited to the very
words of the Constitutional guarantee, strictly construed, for
cases which will arise ten years hence.
A study of a few saplings may help to clarify this point.
In Time for March 18, 1939, appeared the following item:
"W PAyoff . . . to each of its 10,000 members the American
Federation of Actors said preemptorily last week: Thou shalt not
crack wise about the WPA, on pain of fine or suspension. Aware that
(1) many of its members were working on WPA; (2) many WPA
workers had walked out on gags at their expense, the Federation
termed all such wisecracking 'degrading and injurious', compared it to
making jokes at a funeral."

The restriction referred to sprang from the element of society
whose journalistic representatives would be the first to howl
at any thought of restriction on political criticism in general,
and more particularly at restrictions on attacks in the press on
the wealthier element. For fifteen years after the World War,
these elements were on the outside looking in, and were very
zealous to protect their rights. Now they are, comparatively,
on the inside track, and may tend to consolidate that position
by discouraging criticism of it.
See, for discussion of the general rules: Hale and Benson, Law
of the Press, (St. Paul, 1933), pp. 349-369; Paterson, op. cit., supra;
Fisher, H. M., Freedom of the Press; Brown, Some Points on the Law
of the Press, 95 Central L. J. 59 (1922). A brief discussion from the
quo vadis angle is Willis, Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 4 Indiana
L. J. 445 (1929).
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Among other recent items of interest to be considered in
this connection are the articles, reviews, and editorials pointing
out the growth of certain organized groups of a professedly
patriotic nature, and their leaders, as a menace to the civilization
of this country, and more than suggesting that their growth be
severely curbed by confiscating their rights of freedom of speech
and of the press. And on the other side of the struggle we see
editorials today in such magazines as Colliers citing examples
of restriction in communications in certain respects, and contending that the Constitutional guarantee is being defied by
those restrictions. Among well-known writers, William Allen
White takes a similar stand. After many years of building the
Constitutional law on this subject, and in spite of the cases and
expositions now existing, the quarrel still goes on, wherever
people say things that other people do not like, and wherever
people find that they may not publish just what they please.
From these present-day omens, read in the light of the
history of the doctrine, and the legal development of the topic,
it is purposed to draw two conclusions. First, it seems that there
is no immuntable, everlasting division of the forces taking part
in the struggle for freedom of the press. With the exception
of a few notable liberals, who believe that "liberty of the press
means liberty for those with whom we disagree",126 the sides
taken in questions of this sort depend on whose ox is being
gored. Even in the past, few followed Voltaire's famous dictum.
Even Milton, who with his Areopagitica, struck a great blow
for the cause, would except from its benefits Papists. John
Stuart AMll, Bertrand Russell, even Walter Lipmann, when
they say absolute freedom of the press means absolute freedom
for all except wrong-thinkers, and so it seems to be with the
leaders of the cause today-the American people. Where moral
and political issues grow too serious, then the factions will cease
to believe in freedom of the press for each other. This second
conclusion, that the strongest advocates of freedom of the press
cease to advocate it, when their substantive political or moral
views become sufficiently pronounced, as to those at variance
with them, is a lesson to be learned from the recent realignment
Felix Frankfurter, 37 Har. L. Rev. 1029, following the Holmes
approach.
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of the factions in this country. It is this lesson that leads us
to appreciate the existence of a Constitutional guarantee, hard
to evade, beyond a certain variable point, against all effects
of such a realignment. The First Amendment, and allied provisions, may be mere nebulae in times of comparative natural
harmony, but when the mind of a nation becomes aroused
against a small minority, they do their greatest work.

